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THE DEATH PENALTY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND 
~~§~~yf~~~§=================================================================== 
The death penalty, which falls within regulations governing criminal law and 
procedure and which is today often included in constitutional law, has not 
always been taken into consideration under international law. On the 
contrary, on the basis of the principle of 'non-interference in internal 
affairs', a state could exclude all other states and the international 
community as a whole from any matter falling within the sphere of its own 
sovereignty. 
Under contemporary international law, however, following important changes, 
the question of capital punishment has come to the fore in the context of the 
international safeguarding of human rights. Since the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in 1948, the individual has been considered not only as simply a 
'foreigner' (in other words, as someone falling within the sovereignty of 
another international subject), but as an individual, and states have 
undertaken reciprocally, through international agreements, to treat all 
individuals, beginning with their own citizens, in a certain way. The 
increased cooperation between states in a wide range of areas, and in 
particular in the criminal field through the extradition procedure, also has 
a bearing on capital punishment. These are the areas in relation to which the 
question of capital punishment is dealt with in international conventions and 
resolutions. It must be remembered, however, that from the legal point of 
view, the death penalty is still to a large extent regulated by the state. 
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that 'Everyone 
has the right to life, liberty and security of person'. It was in the context 
of the right to life that the death penalty was debated in the preparatory 
work for the Declaration. Those who felt that the text should §!E~§§§!Y state 
that the death penalty violates the right to life were decidedly in a 
minority, and at the end of the discussion it was decided that the death 
penalty would not be mentioned at all in the Declaration. This decision was 
also based on the wish to leave the details of each of the provisions to be 
dealt with under the binding agreements already planned. Let us now review the 
various conventions in chronological order, keeping (for reasons of space) to 
global and European developments. 
The ~~~QE§~~-~9~Y~~~!9~_9F_~~~~F_Jii~~t~-Q~_12~Q is the first general binding 
agreement-on-human--iights:-wfiife-It-does--incfude the right to life (Article 
2), it explicitly excludes the death penalty from the enforcement of such 
right, and sets no limit on the possibility of carrying out the death 
sentence. 
The !~t~~~~t!Q~~!_gQy~~~~t_Q~_g!y!!_~~Q-~Q!!t!g~!_B!9ht§L_12§§L however, which 
was intended--to-fransfafe-some-of--the-principles-enshrlned--[n the Universal 
Declaration into legal obligations, stipulates in Article 6 that: 
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'1 . Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be 
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. 
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death 
may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law 
in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to 
the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only 
be carried out pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a competent 
court. 
3. ( ... ) 
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or 
commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the 
sentence of death may be granted in all cases. 
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons 
below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant 
women. 
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or prevent the abolition 
of capital punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant.' 
By referring in Article 6 ( 2) to countries which have not yet abolished the 
death penalty, the Covenant therefore implies approval of those countries 
which have abolished it. Paragraph 6 also states that nothing in Article 6 may 
be interpreted in such a way as to prevent or delay the abolition of capital 
punishment. Also, in a 'general comment' in 1982, the Human Rights Committee, 
the organ responsible for interpreting the provisions of the Covenant, states 
that the tone of Article 6 'strongly suggests that abolition is desirable' and 
that 'abolition is a progress in the enjoyment of the right to life'. In 
short, the abolition of the death penalty, which is not yet obligatory under 
international law, is nevertheless perceived as an objective to be pursued, 
however gradually. The objective of abolition is also reiterated, from 1971 
onwards, in successive resolutions (which have a purely exhortatory value) of 
the United Nations General Assembly. 
The establishment of the objective of abolition has not been without practical 
consequences, since it has been pursued, gradually, through the introduction 
of a series of limitations on the use of capital punishment. The 
international, universal and regional agreements in this area show that the 
limits fall into three categories: 
A. ~~~~~g=f~~g~~~~=~~=Jp~==~~t~~~=~~=~~~:2F~~~=!~F:~PJ~P=J=~~=~~~t~~~~~~~=~~ 
I?!:~§9!:!Q~Q. Article 6 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
ArHC1e_4_ of the ~~!:!92!L.9.9!l.Y.§!!l.!:.J..9!l __ o_n __ fi~C!r:!_B.!ght§ stipulate that capital 
punishment may be 1mposed--1onfy-for-the-most-ser1ous- crimes'. The guarantees 
for those who risk death by capital punishment adopted by the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1984 (resolution 1984/50 of. 2 May 
1984) state that these 'should not go beyond intentional crimes, with lethal 
or other extremely grave consequences' . The 'general comment' of the Human 
Rights Committee already quoted above clearly states that capital punishment 
must be considered as 'quite an exceptional measure'. 
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The death penalty clearly may not be imposed except in respect of a crime for 
which such a punishment was expressly laid down at the time it was committed. 
A separate and more problematic question is the possible ban on the 
reintroduction of capital punishment for a crime for which it had been 
abolished. Such a ban is explicitly included in the American Convention on 
Human Rights (Article 4 ( 2) ) . It is uncertain, however, whether such an 
interpretation may be drawn from the wording of Article 6 of the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. 
Finally, the death penalty must in no case imply the violation of other human 
rights and therefore may not be imposed, for example, for a crime of opinion. 
Only under the American Convention is it also banned for political crimes. 
B. ~~~~~~=f~J~~Jp~=~~=~~~:PJ~~~P~J~==t~~~~~~~=~~~~F~==~~~~~~~=g=~~p~~p~~==~t 
g~~th· According to Article 6 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
the-death penalty may only be imposed following a fair trial pursuant to 
Article 14 of the Covenant. This involves respecting, at least, in the words 
of the Human Rights Committee 'the right to a fair hearing by an independent 
tribunal, the presumption of innocence, the minimum guarantees for the 
defence, and the right to review by a higher tribunal'. The guarantees 
formulated in 1984 by the United Nations Economic and Social Council already 
quoted above also state that the death penalty may be imposed 'only when the 
guilt of the person charged is based upon clear and convincing evidence 
leaving no room for an alternative explanation of the facts'. In other words, 
a particularly rigorous proof of guilt is called for. Article 6 ( 4) of the 
Covenant (followed in this by Article 4 ( 6) of the American Convention) 
stipulates that anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon 
or commutation of the sentence. Only the American Convention, however, 
specifically states that capital punishment shall not be imposed while such a 
petition for pardon or commutation is pending decision. 
C. !!!m!t§_X~l_C!.t:lJ:!g_ _ _tg __ th~ _ _P._e_r_s_Q..Il._§g!).,tg!).,9gQ.. The idea that persons below 
eighteen-years--of-age-cannot-have-reached-complete maturity and may therefore 
not be considered fully responsible in the same way as adults has resulted, in 
the field of human rights, in a corresponding ban on the death penalty for 
persons under this age. The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
American Convention and the guarantees of the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council all include provisions to this effect. The American Convention 
also states that capital punishment shall not be imposed on persons who, at 
the time the crime was committed, were over 70 years of age. 
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that the death sentence 
shall not be carried out on pregnant women. The United Nations guarantees of 
1984 extend this ban to mothers during the first months of their child's 
life. 
Finally, it is held in many quarters that the death penalty should never be 
imposed on people who are seriously mentally deficient or disturbed. The 
ECOSOC guarantees of 1984 include a provision to this effect. 
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~~~~~~g~£2~g~==~~l~~=PE=~~~~~~=~2f==~~~==~~~~~t~~~=2~==~~~==~~~t~=p~~~J~y==~~ 
g~g~~Hm~ 
The most significant development, which goes beyond simply pinpointing the 
objective of abolition, first came about in Europe. An initiative which began 
in 1978 resulted in 1983 in the adoption of the §!~th_~!QtQ~Q!_tQ_th~-~~!QQ~2~ 
~Q~Y~~t!2~-2~-~~~~-~J9F~§, the first internationaf-freafi-fffiere£ore-Ie9aii¥ 
binding;-even--though-within a limited geographical area) to provide for the 
abolition of the death penalty in peacetime. The Sixth Protocol entered into 
force in 1985 and has been ratified by 16 Member States of the Council of 
Europe and by 3 other countries (source: Amnesty International, Death Penalty 
News, February 1991). 
A similar development also occurred more recently at world level. In 1989 the 
United Nations General Assembly adopted (by 59 votes to 26, with 48 
abstentions) the §~~Q~Q-~P~J2~) __ ~!QtQ~Q!_~9 __ tQ~-J~~~F~~~jg~~l--~~~~~~~t_Q~ 
~!Y!!_§P9--~~t~t~~~l~B!9ht§~-Tb1s--was-t&e-pos1tive--oufcome-o£-mar.ti-¥ears-o£ 
discussion-within-the-United Nations, in which the 'abolitionist' states still 
form a minority. The Second Protocol has now been signed by 21 states and 
ratified by 11. It entered into force in June 1991. 
~~~=~~~~p=Jg~~~lt~=~~~==t~~=~£~~~==~oJ==~~=~~JJ~f==~~~~~~=£~~~~==~~=~~~~g~~~~ 
g~~~g~m~~~ 
Many consider that besides constituting a violation of the right to life, the 
death penalty may also violate another fundamental and inalienable human 
right, i.e. the right not to suffer cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment. 
This right is included in all the main human rights agreements and, according 
to most scholars, may also now be covered by an international consuetudinary 
rule, binding on all states. 
Some countries have explicitly stated, during the most recent sessions of the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, that they consider capital 
punishment to constitute a serious violation of the above right. At European 
level, however, there has been a more significant development in this 
direction. In 1989, in connection with the case of §Q~!!~g_x_.!:fl~ __ tl.Il!.t~Q. 
~!~ggQ~, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the-extradition--of-an 
individual from a State Party to the European Convention on Human Rights to a 
country in which, in all probability, he would be sentenced to death, would be 
in violation of Article 3 of the Convention (which concerns inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment) . In fact the Court did not consider the 
death sentence itself or its execution as determining factors so much as the 
circumstances which would more or less inevitably accompany it (in particular 
the long and uncertain wait on 'death row' and the relative conditions of 
imprisonment). The theory that the death penalty itself also violates the 
right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading punishment was set out in a 
memorandum submitted to the Court by Amnesty International, and is supported 
by a minority of opinion. 
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Before concluding, it is important to point out the other means by which the 
death penalty may be taken into consideration under international law, i.e. 
penal cooperation between states through extradition. When considered in the 
context of the protection of fundamental rights, the choice to abolish the 
death penalty appears to be a decision to accept and promote a potentially 
universal value and not a decision relating to the penal system of an 
individual state. It may follow that if a state which still has the death 
penalty asks an 'abolitionist' state to extradite an individual who would as a 
consequence risk being sentenced to death in the first state, the second state 
could stipulate the condition that the individual in question should not be 
sentenced to death (or that the sentence should not be carried out), and, if 
this condition is not accepted, could refuse to extradite him. 
Article 11 of the European Convention on Extradition of 1957 includes a rule 
which allows an exception, in the case of capital punishment, to the general 
obligation to extradite: 
'If the offence for which extradition is requested is punishable by death 
under the law of the requesting Party, and if in respect of such offence the 
death penalty is not provided for by the law of the requested Party or is not 
normally carried out, extradition may be refused unless the requesting Party 
gives such assurances as the requested Party considers sufficient that the 
death penalty will not be carried out.' 
It is not possible here to go further into the problems which could arise with 
respect to the 'sufficient assurances' that a death sentence will not be 
issued or the death penalty not carried out. It is important to note, however, 
that, while it has been impossible so far to impose an obligation to abolish 
the death penalty via the adoption of an international agreement, some 
'abolitionist' states have nevertheless in this way been able to some degree 
to extend the effects of their contrary position beyond the limits of their 
own jurisdiction. 
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Sixth Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms concerning the abolition of the death penalty 
§!g.Q~t~f~§-~~Q_f~t!~!9~t!Q~§ (situation at 31 December 1991) 
---Belgium-:::::::::::::::::..... has signed has not ratified 
Cyprus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . h~§-~QL§!g.Q~Q 
Greece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iias-sigtiea----
Hungary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . has signed 
Ireland...................... h~§-~Qt_§!g.Q~Q 
Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fi~~=ngC~!9n~~ 
United Kingdom............... ~~~=~~~=~~~~~ 
European Convention on Extradition 
Article 11 states as follows: Q~~:t!LJ2~llC!~tt: 1 If the offence for which 
extradition is requested is punlsh"ab1e--b'y--death under the law of the 
requesting Party, and if in respect of such offence the death penalty is not 
provided for by the law of the requested Party or is not normally carried out, 
extradition may be refused unless the requesting Party gives such assurance as 
the requested Party considers sufficient that the death penalty will not be 
carried out 1 • 
§!g.Q~t~f~§-~~Q_f~t!~!9~t!Q~§ (situation in December 1990) 
---Belgium-:::::::::::::::::..... has signed only 
United Kingdom............... has signed only 
Malta ...................... h~§-~Qt_§!g.Q~Q 
Hungary...................... fi~~=ngt:~!9n~~ 
San Marino................... ~~~=~g~=~~~~~ 
All the other Member States of the Council of Europe have signed and ratified. 
Israel has acceded. 
The Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights aiming at the abolition of the death penalty (adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly on 15 December 1989 by 59 votes to 26 with 48 
abstentions) entered into force in June 1991 following the tenth ratification. 
Signatures and ratifications (situation at 31 December 1991) 
11 countries have ratified the Protocol: 
Australia 
Finland 
Germany 
Iceland 
Netherlands 
- -New Zealand 
"--Norway 
Portugal 
- ---Romania 
Spain 
Sweden 
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10 countries have signed: 
Austria 
Belgium 
Costa Rica 
Denmark 
Honduras 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Nicaragua 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
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THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY 
=============================================== 
The theoretical debate between those who support 
in favour of abolition is relatively recent. 
punishment was not in fact called into question 
until the eighteenth century. 
the death penalty and those 
The legitimacy of capital 
by philosophers and lawyers 
The debate is rendered even more difficult by the fact that the various 
arguments are based on different axiological suppositions which are difficult 
to compare. Thus ethical arguments and utilitarian arguments are put forward 
and mixed together in the discussion. In other words, on the one hand the 
question is whether the death penalty is ethically justified or not, and on 
the other hand whether it is useful or necessary to achieve a certain end. 
This obviously involves two separate questions which depend on two different 
criteria of judgement, which may in their turn lead to different but not 
necessarily contradictory conclusions (the death penalty may be considered, at 
least in theory, as 'just but not useful' or 'useful but not just', or 'just 
and useful' or 'neither just nor useful'). In any case, it follows that there 
is no real dialogue, and it should come as no surprise that the debate has not 
reached any final conclusion. Despite this, however, the 'abolitionist' side 
tends to prevail in the long run among scholars and those in politics and 
government. 
It should be noted, to clarify the context in which the debate takes place, 
that the different positions are not only linked to the different concepts 
relating to the purpose of punishment but also to the different concepts of 
society and the state and their respective advocates. There is no doubt that 
the organic concept of Aristotle and St Thomas Aquinas according to which the 
'parts' may be sacrificed for the good of the 'whole' has provided the 
supporters of capital punishment with an important argument. On the other hand 
it is no accident that the first arguments against capital punishment put 
forward by Cesare Beccaria originated in the context of an individualist 
ideology. 
In the first part of this report it has been seen how, since the end of the 
Second World War, capital punishment has been considered as a possible 
violation of internationally protected human rights. It would seem appropriate 
to stick to the same starting point. The debate surrounding the death penalty 
cannot in fact be separated from the subject of fundamental rights. In the 
first place there is the right to life, the enjoyment of which is instrumental 
to the enjoyment of all other rights. It is a matter of discussion, from the 
legal and philosophical point of view, whether capital punishment constitutes 
an exception to the enjoyment of this right. 
The abolitionist argument of the inevitable cruelty of capital punishment has 
developed more recently so that it now also embraces the right not to be 
subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 
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Finally, it has been rightly pointed out that the death penalty can sometimes 
be a means or one of the means through which other rights are violated (such 
as the right to freedom of opinion or expression where it is decided to 
'eliminate' a non-violent political opponent by execution) or an aggravating 
factor of other violations (for example where the death penalty is imposed 
following an unfair trial). 
Let us, however, consider capital punishment from the point of view, by far 
the most prevalent, of the right to life. The question is whether capital 
punishment can constitute an exception to the general principle, i.e. whether 
it can be deemed a homicide 'with just cause'. It is the existence of the 
exception (the 'just cause') and not the general principle (not to take life) 
which must be demonstrated. It is in this way that the debate has proceeded. 
The death penalty as a possible exception to the enjoyment of the right to 
life is firstly justified, in general terms, on the grounds of legitimate 
defence by the state against the criminal. But does it make sense to claim 
that the state can act in legitimate self defence against an individual? 
According to the abolitionists the death penalty has neither the prerequisites 
nor the characteristic features of legitimate self defence. On the one hand, 
the state, which has the monopoly of force, has at its disposal alternative 
punishments (and alternative means to combat crime). On the other hand, a 
death sentence imposed following a trial is no longer an !~~g!~t~ response to 
the crime, but R¥~m~g~~g~~g legal homicide. ---------
Let us move to the specific area of criminal law. In this context the position 
on capital punishment is in general the result of a choice between the various 
theories on the purpose of punishment. Those who support the theory of 
punishment as retribution usually also support the death penalty. It is 
claimed in fact that it is 'just', irrespective of whether it is necessary or 
useful. Opponents of capital punishment win, however, with reference to the 
utilitarian theory of punishment as a deterrent, since the death penalty has 
never been able to prove either its usefulness or its necessity. From the 
point of view of the criminal, the theory of retribution corresponds with the 
theory of expiation, which is if nothing else compatible with the death 
penalty. The utilitarian theory of reparation, however, is quite incompatible 
with a position in favour of capital punishment. Again, we are confronted with 
a difficult comparison between different basic values. 
Let us consider the various aspects in turn, beginning with the question of 
whether the death penalty has a dissuasive effect which would justify its 
retention. An initial intuitive response may be that it does, but further 
reflection, though based only on common sense and with no claim to scientific 
rigour, could lead to the opposite conclusion. In many cases of homicide or 
crimes which may be - and often are - committed through passion or fear or 
under the effects of alcohol or perhaps by persons who are mentally unstable, 
it would seem unlikely that the murderer was able to calculate with a clear 
head the consequences of his act before committing it. In cases where the 
criminal does actually consider the possible consequences of his crime, it is 
likely that he believes he has a good chance of not being discovered or 
arrested. In other words, it would be the uncertainty of the punishment and 
not its lightness which would reduce the deterrent effect. 
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Among the scientific studies carried out on the deterrent effect of capital 
punishment, which are numerous but not all beyond criticism at a 
methodological level, the first important research carried out for the United 
Nations in 1962 (the so-called Ancel Report) reached the conclusion that: 'All 
the information available appears to confirm that such a removal (of the death 
penalty) has, in fact, never been followed by a notable rise in the incidence 
of the crime no longer punishable with death'. And more than 25 years later in 
1988, the UN Committee on Crime Prevention and Control further stated that, 
though it does not appear to be possible to reach definitive conclusions 
because of the large number of variables to be taken into consideration, 'the 
fact that all the evidence continues to point in the same direction is ~ 
p~!Q~! evidence that countries need not fear sudden and serious changes in the 
curve-of crime if they reduce their reliance upon the death penalty'. 
There must be some doubt, however, whether such studies can really reach 
convincing conclusions and significantly influence policy decisions. This is 
the conclusion of the most recent and authoritative commentators, including 
the committee of experts in various fields which was commissioned to compile 
an objective technical assessment of these studies by the National Academy of 
Sciences USA in 1975. The most recent study on capital punishment carried out 
for the United Nations (the Hood report, 1991), also expresses the opinion 
that the diversity of political or moral convictions tends to re-emerge in the 
assessment of evidence. The abolitionists would presumably maintain, according 
to Hood, that the death penalty must have a ggm~!g~~~Q!Y greater deterrent 
effect than other forms of punishment in order--for--its retention (or 
reintroduction) to be taken seriously into consideration, while those in 
favour of capital punishment would be content with less rigorous evidence. The 
conclusion of the report is, however, that the balance of evidence tends 
towards those who support the abolition of the death penalty. 
If, therefore, the question of the death penalty is considered exclusively 
from the point of view of its deterrent effect, the abolitionists would seem 
to have the greater number of valid arguments. No dissuasive effect seems in 
fact to have been proved. On the contrary, there are commentators and scholars 
who argue that capital punishment could even increase the incidence of violent 
crime because of the 'brutalizing' effect it would have. We will not examine 
this theory since, as has been shown, it seems sufficient to be able to state 
with certainty that the case for the 'just cause' exception has not been 
argued successfully. Nor will we go further here into the observation, from 
authoritative quarters, that the use of the death penalty would have the 
effect of distracting from the planning of measures which are really effective 
in the fight against crime. 
The argument on the lack of deterrent effect also has a weak side, however, or 
at least a limit. If it were possible to demonstrate that, perhaps at a given 
moment and in certain given circumstances, capital punishment really had a 
dissuasive effect, the entire abolitionist theory would crumble. This is not a 
minor objection, but in fact the debate is never conducted on a single front, 
and each assessment must therefore be based on all the considerations put 
forward. 
The difficult problem of recidivists also comes into play in decisions on the 
usefulness or necessity of capital punishment. There is no doubt that the 
execution of a death sentence prevents the criminal from repeating his crime. 
This is obviously not the problem under discussion. The first question is to 
what extent and on what time-scale is it possible to establish that a criminal 
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will commit the same type of crime again. And the other question is, once 
again, what alternative means there are to prevent this happening. Various 
important studies point out that it is extremely difficult to make 
predictions, especially in the long term, on the repetition of crime. Others 
suggest that this tends to be very low in relation to 'capital' offences 
(taking into consideration in particular the instances of homicides in the 
United Kingdom and the United States) . However, there are also cases of 
murderers sentenced to many years of imprisonment who, on their release, have 
killed again. To sum up, the supporters of capital punishment see it as a 
certain way of preventing brutal criminals from continuing to cause suffering. 
The abolitionists see this as a system of justice which can be criticized on 
the grounds that it relies on irrevocable measures based on very uncertain 
predictions (thus 'pointlessly' sacrificing a large number of human lives) and 
thus demonstrates its inability to prevent crime via more acceptable means. 
Moving from the utilitarian to the ethical, the question is asked whether the 
death penalty is 'just'. On the basis of the retribution theory, supported 
amongst others by Kant and Hegel, the purpose of punishment is to dispense 
justice (and not to prevent crime). On these grounds, the death penalty is 
justified as a punishment which perfectly fits the crime (obviously in the 
case of murder). This thesis, which is in fact very little in evidence among 
the arguments put forward by political leaders in favour of the retention or 
reintroduction of the death penalty, is countered by the fundamental idea of 
the inalienability of human rights. According to the retribution theory, a 
person who kills deserves to be killed. But fundamental rights cannot be 
denied an individual simply because he has committed a crime, however brutal. 
The very idea of fundamental human rights rests on their inalienability and 
conflicts, at least in the case which directly interests us, with the idea of 
retributional justice. If certain individuals 'deserve' the death penalty, it 
is not clear why - still according to the theory in question - others could 
not 'deserve' to be tortured or imprisoned without trial. 
In fact the ethical argument for abolition, based on the inalienability of 
certain fundamental human rights, not only counters the retribution theory 
but also with the arguments based on the alleged usefulness or necessity of 
punishment, and therefore simply adds to the opposing abolitionist arguments 
(which maintain that the death penalty is not useful) without making them 
conclusive. 
The argument on the inalienability of human rights would seem to be 
strengthened by certain other considerations. It is questionable whether there 
could ever be a system of justice capable of deciding who - supposing for the 
sake of argument that it is 'just' - deserves to be punished with death, that 
is a punishment (in a certain sense the only punishment) which is 
irreversible. The possibility of mistakes, which exists to a certain extent 
- even though it is sometimes minimal - in all legal decisions, is not 
compatible, according to the abolitionists, with an irreversible punishment. 
There is another consideration. All too often, and the reports by Amnesty 
International fully document the phenomenon, the decision as to who will be 
put to death and who will be reprieved does not depend solely on the crime 
committed, but also on the social and the ethnic origin of the criminal, on 
his financial means and his political views. In such circumstances, in view of 
the possibility of error and the spread of ethnic, political, social and 
economic discrimination, it would seem more than ever in<:propriate to entrust 
anyone with the power to impose the definitive puni3hment of death. 
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There is one final point which should be mentioned, which lies outside the 
subject, which almost all the arguments in favour of or opposed to the death 
penalty, the right to life and possible exceptions to its enjoyment have come 
up against, i.e. the question of the cruelty (or 1 harshness 1 ) of capital 
punishment. 
The point made is that it is impossible, despite every effort, to conceive a 
system of carrying out the death penalty which is not cruel and degrading for 
the condemned person. None of the methods in current use can guarantee rapid 
and certain death without other effects before the victim finally dies. 
Furthermore, the length of time between the passing of the death sentence and 
execution is often very long (generally for understandable reasons, such as 
the need to follow a particularly rigorous procedure). The condemned person is 
caught between the hope of life and the need to prepare for death, with all 
the psychological and emotional suffering this involves. 
There is a parallel between this abolitionist thesis and the development we 
discussed in the section dealing with international conventions whereby 
capital punishment is also seen from the point of view of the right not to be 
subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment. Both shift the 
terms of the question onto different ground from that of the traditional 
debate for and against the death penalty. 
The development of the legal and de facto situation regarding the provision 
and application of the death penalty in the world reveals a highly 
contradictory pattern. 
While it is true that on the one hand the establishment of the right to life 
as a fundamental right laid down in international treaties is the result of a 
change of feeling and the gradual establishment of an abolitionist trend, it 
should nevertheless not be forgotten that more than half the countries in the 
world still have the death penalty on their statute books and that even in the 
last decade there has been evidence of negative developments both in terms of 
legal statutes and in public opinion. 
The prevalence of an abolitionist tendency has had various consequences. In 
the first place, some states have chosen total abolition, while others have 
kept it only for exceptional crimes (such as those committed in wartime). 
In the second place, even in states which still have the death penalty there 
has been a gradual 1 delegitimization 1 which has been demonstrated by; 
(a) a tendency not to carry out the death sentence (de facto abolition), 
including indefinite suspensions of the sentence or the application of 
clemency in all cases; 
(b) the reduction, though with exceptions which we will indicate, of the 
number of offences punishable by death, limitation of the crimes for which 
the death penalty is obligatory and, in general, the tendency to provide 
for a series of circumstances in which it cannot be imposed or carried 
out. 
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On the other side of the coin, it should be pointed out that some states have 
increased the number of offences punishable by death and that it is still 
frequently applied without the guarantees and procedures expressly laid down 
in all the international human conventions on human rights. 
That being said, we propose to give an outline of the situation regarding the 
death penalty in the world, using information updated in January 1991. 
96 states retain and use the death penalty for ordinary crimes, which is over 
half the countries which currently make up the international community. None 
of the Community Member States is among these (Annex 1). 
According to information provided by Amnesty International, in 1990, 2029 
executions took place in 26 countries, and 2005 death sentences were passed in 
54 countries. The real figures are certainly higher, since not all 
governments make death sentences public and since so-called 'extra-judicial' 
executions should be taken into consideration. 
20 countries, which are considered 'abolitionist de facto' have not executed 
anyone for the last 25 years, even though the death penalty is still on their 
statute books (also for non-exceptional crimes). It should be pointed out that 
death sentences have been passed even recently in some of these countries. 
Community de facto abolitionist states are Belgium and Greece (Annex 2). 
16 states have abolished the death penalty except for exceptional crimes such 
as crimes under military law or crimes committed in wartime. There are three 
Community Member States among these ( !tal y, the United Kingdom and Spain) 
(Annex 3). 
49 states have abolished the death penalty for all crimes. 7 of these are 
Community Member States, and another 13 are European non-Community states. 11 
are in Latin America, 8 in Oceania, 3 in Africa and 2 in Asia (Annex 4). 
Since 1976, 35 countries have abolished the death penalty: some only for 
ordinary crimes, others for all crimes and others have extended abolition 
already in force for ordinary crimes to include exceptional crimes. In 1991 
five countries (Anguilla, Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands, Montserrat, 
and Turks and Caicos Islands) abolished the death penalty for all offences, 
while Nepal abolished the death penalty for ordinary offences (Annex 5). 
At the end of last year, the Hungarian Constitutional Court ruled that the 
death penalty violates the right to life and dignity as laid down in the 
country's constitution. The Irish parliament recently voted to abolish capital 
punishment for its three remaining capital offences. Finally, still in Europe, 
the Turkish National Assembly decided on 29 November 1990 that capital 
punishment would be abolished for 16 of the offences for which it is 
prescribed. The death penalty still remains obligatory in Turkey for many 
other crimes. 
The situation in the United States is controversial; the death sentence is 
provided for under federal law and the laws of 37 states, while it has been 
abolished in 13 states. After a suspension from 1962 to 1976, following a 
decision by the Supreme Court that the death penalty was not unconstitutional, 
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if applied under certain conditions, capital executions began again, and over 
130 people have been put to death and more than 2000 are currently on 'death 
row'. 
While a certain abolitionist tendency has grown in strength in recent years, 
especially thanks to the greater level of democracy achieved in many 
countries, it should also be noted that as a result of political upheaval or 
campaigns to repress certain crimes, many states have increased the number of 
offences punishable by death. 
At the end of 1990 the President of Pakistan extended the provision of the 
death penalty to kidnapping, previously punishable by life imprisonment. Also 
at the end of 1990, the Parliament of the Maldives decided to include 
terrorism among the crimes punishable by death. No death sentences have been 
carried out in the Maldives since 1952, however. 
Efforts to check the growth of drug trafficking have led many countries to 
include this crime among the offences punishable by death or to make the death 
penalty obligatory for this crime where it was a possible option. Ten states 
have introduced the death penalty for drugs-related crimes in the last ten 
years, bringing the total number to 24. Since a new law against drugs came 
into force in Iran in 1989, over 1600 people have been sentenced to death and 
executed. In Malaya, since 1983 when the death penalty was made obligatory, 
more than 1 00 people have been put to death and another 200 are in prison 
awaiting death for drugs trafficking. 
In 1989 Egypt carried out its first death sentence for drugs trafficking. 
According to data provided by Amnesty International, 750 official executions 
were carried out in China in 1990 (the actual figure seems to be around 
12,000): this is the highest figure since 1983 when, following the 
introduction of a widespread campaign against crime, around 10,000 executions 
were carried out. 
There have been signs of a revived temptation to resort to the death penalty 
within the Community. Following particularly serious crimes there have been 
movements not only in public opinion but also in various political sectors 
towards the restoration of the death penalty. 
More significant and worrying is the fact that among the countries which 
retain and use the death penalty for ordinary crimes there are some which 
persist in applying it to crimes or to individuals or in ways for which its 
use is prohibited under the international conventions. 
In the first place, several states have the death penalty on their statute 
books (and use it) for a large number of crimes which certainly do not belong 
in the category of 'most serious crimes'. Furthermore, there have been cases, 
even recently, of the retroactive application of the death penalty (for 
example in Nigeria for ordinary crimes and in Iran for political crimes), and 
cases where for certain crimes the death penalty has been replaced by a less 
severe punishment, but those who had already been sentenced to death for such 
crimes have not been reprieved (in certain states of the United States of 
America). 
With regard to the categories of persons normally excluded from the 
application and/or execution of the death penalty, while the great majority of 
statutes prohibit its use for persons under 18 at the time the crime was 
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committed, 8 minors were nevertheless put to death in the 1980s (one in 
Bangladesh, one in Barbados, three in Pakistan and three in the United 
States). It should also be borne in mind that there is no data on the 
executions of minors which have certainly taken place in Iran and Iraq. 
The death penalty has also been carried out on very elderly people in recent 
years. Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, the seventy-six-year-old leader of an Islamic 
organization was hanged in Sudan in 1985. In the USSR in 1987, seventy-eight-
year-old Fiodor Fedorenko was condemned to death and executed for war crimes. 
Again in 1987, this time in Japan, ninety-five-year-old Sadamichi Hirasawa 
died in prison of pneumonia. He had been awaiting execution for 37 years, and 
had made 17 appeals for the case to be re-opened, all of which were rejected. 
It is difficult to establish how many people of diminished mental capacity 
have been condemned to death and executed in recent years. There are in fact 
doubts about the criteria to be applied in ascertaining diminished mental 
capacity, and also difficulties in finding the relevant data. It is known, 
however, that since 1984 at least 6 people with very reduced mental capacity 
and another 5 who were psychologically disturbed have been put to death in 
the United States. 
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One very serious aspect pointed up by many Amnesty International reports, and 
to which insufficient attention has often been paid, is the right to a fair 
trial. In the late 1980s in no less than 37 countries the death penalty was 
imposed either by special tribunals or on the basis of unfair proceedings. 
This means that over the last ten years, thousands of people have been put to 
death following a trial with no guarantees. 
Even today in certain countries accused persons are not given the opportunity 
to prepare any sort of defence by presenting witnesses or providing evidence 
in their favour, and sometimes the onus is on the accused to prove his 
innocence. 
Often trials, especially those involving political opponents accused of 
threatening national security, are held in secret, with no possibility of any 
observation by independent organizations or by the public. 
Another guarantee which is denied or made extremely difficult by some 
regulations is the right to appeal against a death sentence, especially when 
passed by tribunals set up under special laws or by military tribunals. 
We will give only a few examples. The Islamic Revolutionary Courts in Iran 
have often passed the death sentence for political crimes, without the 
accused being allowed any assistance in his defence or given leave to appeal 
against the sentence, and, in certain cases, after a trial lasting only a few 
minutes. The Iranian Penal Code states that even for crimes punishable by 
death, guilt may be proven solely on the basis of the sworn testimony of 
'virtuous men', which may not be contested by the accused. 
In Guinea there have been cases of people being condemned without having 
appeared before a court, or even people put to death without having been aware 
of ever undergoing a 'trial'. In Afghanistan, the law makes no provision for 
any form of counsel for the defence in trials for 'anti-state' or 
'counterrevolutionary' activities which are heard before the Special 
Revolutionary Courts. There have been cases of trials without any form of 
defence also in Iraq, Ghana, Liberia and Rwanda. On some occasions in Turkey 
the counsel for the defence has been appointed immediately before the trial, 
and therefore with no time to prepare a proper defence. 
In Iraq, trials before the Special Courts are, in the majority of cases, heard 
in camera, with the accused granted no right to bring forward witnesses or 
provide evidence in his defence. The death sentence has often been passed on 
the basis of confessions extorted through torture. 
In China, particularly since the introduction of new measures against the 
spread of crime in 1983, accused persons, including those accused of capital 
offences, are denied the right to receive a copy of the charges before the 
trial, there is no provi~ion for the presumption of innocence and the right to 
a defence, though recognized under the law, is in practice not guaranteed. 
There have been reports of trials in which only six to eight days have passed 
between arrest, the passing of the death sentence and execution. 
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In the majority of states which retain the death penalty, it is used mainly, 
if not exclusively, for murder. According to Amnesty International, of the 63 
countries which carried out the death penalty between 1985 and mid-1988, 25 
were using it solely for people convicted of murder. 
The overall range of capital offences is fairly wide. According to the most 
recent United Nations study (the Hood Report, 1990), for the period 1984-1987, 
22 countries carried out the death penalty for crimes against the state, 10 
countries for terrorist offences, 12 for sex crimes, 15 for offences against 
property (in 7 of these countries for offences relating to finance) and 6 
countries for crimes related to drugs trafficking. 
In many countries governed by Islamic law, capital punishment is used for many 
activities related to sexual behaviour or religious beliefs, the legal 
position of which is vague and arbitrary. In Iran, for example, the death 
penalty is imposed for 'corruption on earth' and for being an 'enemy of God', 
as well as a series of other crimes, some of which are considered immoral, 
such as incest, adultery, sexual relations between a Muslim woman and a non-
Muslim man, sodomy, prostitution, the consumption of alcohol (if habitual) and 
all crimes against the internal and external security of the state. 
In the People's Republic of China the death penalty may be imposed for an 
extremely large number of crimes, both political and ordinary, and is 
considered a necessary measure to prevent anti-socialist influences and 
disorder in the system. Apart from so-called 'counterrevolutionary' crimes 
such as treason, hi-jacking of aircraft, plotting to overthrow the government 
and the organization of secret reactionary societies, a number of 'economic' 
crimes are also punishable by death, including smuggling, corruption and the 
illicit export of cultural goods, along with other offences such as murder, 
kidnapping, robbery, drugs trafficking, rape, pimping and the printing and 
display of pornographic material. Executions are public, and often before 
being put to death condemned prisoners are paraded through the streets on the 
back of open lorries with signs around their necks describing their crimes. 
It is also reported that over roughly the same period capital punishment has 
been used not only for crimes involving violence but also for adultery (Iran 
and Saudi Arabia), prostitution (Iran), keeping a brothel and showing 
pornographic films (China), corruption (USSR) and embezzlement (China, Ghana 
and Somalia) . 
There are currently seven methods of execution in use: hanging, firing squad, 
the electric chair, the gas chamber, lethal injection of poison, decapitation 
and stoning. The first two are the most common, hanging being the method laid 
down by law in 78 countries and execution by firing squad in 86 countries. The 
electric chair, gas chamber and lethal injection are used only in the United 
States (with variations from state to state). Sex crimes are punished under 
Islamic law by decapitation (in five countries) and by stoning (in seven 
countries). The use of the guillotine, which is still on the statute books in 
Zaire and Belgium, is obsolete. 
The causes of death and the time taken to die (and therefore the extent of 
suffering) depend on the method used and the degree of expertise in carrying 
it out. 
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In practice, however, according to the press and evidence gathered by 
humanitarian organizations, even the most sophisticated methods have sometimes 
failed to work, thus prolonging intolerably the suffering of the condemned 
person. 
This information further reinforces the arguments of those who maintain that 
besides violating the right to life, the death penalty is also a form of 
torture and/or cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. 
Before concluding, however, it is important to stress one other point. The 
suffering experienced by a condemned prisoner is not only the physical pain 
endured at the time of execution. From the time he is sentenced to death he is 
forced to continue his existence in the knowledge that his life will be ended 
at a pre-arranged moment and, if there is the chance of an appeal, to live in 
conflict between the hope of survival and the need to prepare for the 
possibility of imminent death. 
Separate mention should be made of public opinion on the question of abolition 
of the death penalty. 
While among philosophers and legal scholars and, on the whole, also among 
those involved in government the abolitionists seem to be in a majority, the 
same is not true with regard to the general 'public feeling'. Numerous surveys 
carried out on this subject show a wide gap between public opinion and the 
theoretical debate. 
In some countries, public op1m.on has been cited in support of the need to 
retain the death penalty on the statute books, sometimes even by politicians 
or government officials who say that they are personally opposed to it. This 
particular 'anti-abolitionist' argument can, however, be criticized on several 
counts. 
In the first place, as the Italian philosopher Norberto Bobbio rightly points 
out, in the case of a choice between good and evil, such as that relating to 
the death penalty, the majority principle cannot be asserted. Furthermore, 
still on the subject of principles, if the death penalty is considered as a 
possible violation of an inalienable human right (whether the right to life or 
the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment), no 
importance can be attached to public opinion in its favour. 
In fact, the surveys are often not very convincing, given the changeability of 
public opinion in the light of events affecting the emotions. In the United 
States and Spain, for example, it has been found that the number of people in 
favour of capital punishment altered considerably when surveys were carried 
out after episodes of terrorist violence. 
In some cases, it should also be borne in mind that the answers given by the 
public are often based on information which may be incomplete, misleading or 
even wrong. In Japan, a survey carried out in 1967 by the Prime Minister's 
Office revealed that 71% of those questioned considered it right to retain the 
death penalty. However, 61% of these believed that the special effectiveness 
of the death penalty as a deterrent had been clearly demonstrated, and 74% 
believed, wrongly, that the number of brutal crimes was on the increase. 
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A study carried out in 1975 in a university town in the United States showed 
that following more information on the subject, the number of people in favour 
of the death penalty went down considerably. 
To sum up, then, for reasons of principle and for reasons relating to the 
changeable nature of public opinion and the frequent lack of correct 
information available to the public, it does not seem wise to rely on opinion 
polls on the death penalty. Clearly there does seem to be a need, however, to 
promote detailed information campaigns both on the aspects relating to the 
violation of the most important human right, the right to life, by the state, 
and also on the particular cruelty of the death penalty, its irreversibility 
and its ineffectiveness as a deterrent measure to combat the rise in crime 
rates. 
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ANNEX 1 
RETENTIONIST 
(Countries __ a~d te~ritories ·\·.-~i:h retain and use the death penalty for ordinary crimesJ• 
Country 
AFGHANISTAN 
ALBANIA 
ALGERIA 
ANGOlA 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 
BAHAMAS 
BANGLADESH 
BARBADOS 
BELIZE 
BEN IN 
BOTSWANA 
BULGARIA 
-BURKI.NA i=ASO 
BURUNDI 
CAMEROON 
CENTRAL AF-RICAN 
REPUBLIC 
-CHAD 
CHILE 
CHINA (People's 
Republic! 
CONGO 
CUBA 
DOMINICA 
-EGYPT 
- ·EQU6'[0RIAL -GUINEA 
ESTONIA 
€THIOPIA 
GABON 
GAMBIA 
.GHANA 
<JRENAOA 
-GUATEMALA 
-GUINEA 
GU!NEA..SISSAU 
GUi'ANA 
INDIA 
INDONESIA 
IRAN 
IRAQ -
JAMAICA 
JAPAN 
JORDAN 
KENYA 
KOREA (Democratic 
People's Republic) 
{North Korea) 
KOREA (Republic! 
(South Korea) 
KUWAIT 
.LAOS 
LATVIA 
LEBANON 
LESOTHO 
LIBERIA 
LIBYA 
LITHUANIA 
MALAWI 
MALAYSIA 
MAL! 
MAURITANIA 
MAURITIUS 
MONGOLIA' 
MOROCCO 
MYANMAR 
NIGERIA 
OMAN 
PAKISTAN 
PAPLJA ~EW GUINEA POLAN 
DATAR 
RWANDA 
SAINT CHRISTOPHER ANO 
NEVIS 
Total: 96 countries and territories 
------------------------------------
SAINT lUCIA 
SAINT VINCENT AND THE 
GRENADINE$ 
SAUDI ARABIA 
SIERRA LEONE 
SINGAPORE 
'SOMALIA 
SOUTH AFf31CA 
SUDAN 
SURINAME 
SWAZILAND 
SYRIA 
TAIWAN (Republic of 
China! 
TANZANIA 
TiiAILAND 
TONG A 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
.TUNISIA 
,TURKEY 
UGANDA 
UNION OF SOVIET 
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 
UNITED STAT-ES OF 
AMERICA 
VIETNAM 
YEMEN 
YUGOSLAVIA 
ZAIRE 
ZAMBIA 
ZIMBABWE 
• Most of these countries and territories are known ;:o have carried out executions during the 
past 10 years. On some countries Amnesty International has no record of executions but is 
unable to ascertain whether or not executions have in fact been carried out. 
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ANNEX 2 
ABOLITIONIST DE FACTO 
. 
!Countries and termories wi"Hcn retain the death penalty for ordinary crimes but ha-.:e not 
executed an vane ciunng tr,e past 10 years or more I 
Countrv. 
BAHRAIN 
BE-LGIUM 
BERMUDA 
BHUTAN 
BOliVIA 
BRUNEIDARUSSALAM 
COMOROS 
COTE D'IVOIRE -
DJIBOUTI 
GREECE 
HONG KONG 
MADAGASCAR 
MALDIVES 
NAURU 
NIGER 
PARAGUAY 
SAMOA, WESTERN 
SENEGAL 
SRI LANKA 
TOGO 
TOTAL: 20 countries and territories 
• Oate of last known execution 
• • No e·xecutions since independence 
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Date of · 
Last Execution 
1977 
1950 
1977 
1964. 
1974 
1957 
... 
1972 
1966 
1958. 
1952. 
1976. 
1928 
1967 
1976 
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ANNEX 3 
<~ • . - 4..1 
. ~ : A80ltTtONrS·1~fOR OROrNARV CRIMES ONL:Y~·:·~ 
. .. :· 'f"iV'"' ... .. ~~~·;;, ..... 
. :.· .. . . )~ -:..·. . :y~.J· . . 
(Countries wtiose laws 6rcvide for the de.a_!h~penalty only for exceptio'O-ar:crimes such as crimes 
under military law or crir.1es committed fn ·exceptional circumstances.·.s~ch·as-wartimel 
. . ..:~;.~ ~ .. ~ :;~ . ~t:.; ~- . 
Country 
ARGENTINA 
BRAZIL . 
CANADA 
CYPRUS 
-EL SALVADOR 
FIJI 
ISRAEL 
ITALY 
MALTA 
MEXICO 
Nf.PAL 
PERU 
SEYCHELLES 
SPAIN 
SWITZERlAND 
UNITED KINGDOM 
TOTAL: 16.countries 
• Date of last known execution 
• • No executions since·iiidependence 
. , .. 
.. ·, .. 
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· Date of 
Abolition 
1984 
1979 
1976 
1983 
1983 
1979 
1954 
1947 
1971 
1990 
1979 
1978 
1942 
1973 
...... • 
T 
Date of 
la"st Execution 
1855 
1962 
1962 
1973• 
.. 1964 
:.: 1962 
. ~,~.-- . 194 7 
. ,. 1943 
1937 
1979 
1979 
1975 
1944 
1964 
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ANNEX 4 
ABOLITIONIST FOR ALL CRIMES 
(Countries whose laws do ~~t=p~~~id~=f~~=th~=d~~th=penalty for any crime) 
ANDORRA 
ANGUILLA 
AUSTRALIA 
AUSTRIA 
BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS 
CAMBODIA 
CAPE VERDE 
CAYMAN ISLANDS 
,. COLOMBIA 
COSTA RICA 
CZECH AND StOVAK FEDERA TlVE REPUBLIC 
DENMARK 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
ECUADOR 
fiNLANO. 
fRANC€ 
fEDERAL 'REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
HAITI 
HONDURAS 
HUNGARY· 
ICELAND 
IRELAND 
KIRIBATl 
.. LIECHTENSTEIN 
LUXEMBOURG 
MARSHALL ISLANDS 
MICRONESIA .(Federated States! 
MONACO -I'IUNfSERRAT 
MOZAMBIQUE 
NAMIBIA 
NETHERLANDS . 
N8N 2EALAND , - ·--= 
NICARAGUA 
NORWAY 
PANAMA 
PHILIPPINES 
PORi"UGAL 
OOMANIA 
SAN MAfliNO 
SAO 'fOME ANO PRINCIPE 
SOlOMON 1SLANDS 
SWEDEN 
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS 
TUVA-LU 
URUGUAY 
VANUATU 
VATICAN CITY ST A iE 
VENEZUELA 
TOTAL: {t-9 courwies 
• Date of last known execution 
• • No executions since independence 
1990 
1985 
1968 
1989 
1981 
1910 
1877 
1990 
1978 
1966 
1906 
1972 
1981 
1949/1987 ••• 
1987 
1956 
1990 
1928 
1990 
1987 
1979 
1 9'62 
1990 
1990 
1982 
1989 
1979 
1979 
1987 
1976 
1989 
1865 
1990 
1972 
1907 
1969 
1853 
1984 
1950 
1933· 
1949 
1870 
1961 
1905 
1867 
1848 
1966 
1921 
Q~t~LQ~ 
~~§~---
~~~~MHgfJ 
1943 
1967 
1950 
1935 
\909 
1988 
\950 
1944 
1977 
1949··· 
1972. 
1940 
1988 
1830 
1954 
1785 
1949 
1847 
1986 
1988. 
1952 
1957 
1930 
1948 
1903. 
1976 
1849. 
1989 
1468. 
1910 
• • • The death penalty was abolished in the Federal Republic of Germany IFRGI in 1949 and i~ the German 
Democratoc neoublic !GDR! in 1987. The last execution on the FRG was on ;9.:9; the date of the last 
executoon on the GDR is not known. The FRG and the GDR were unified in October 1990. The name ol 
tloe unofoe:d country os tne Federal RcnuDioC ot Germ:1nv 
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1976: 
1978: 
1979: 
1981: 
1982: 
1983: 
1984: 
1985: 
1987: 
ANNEX 5 
LIST OF COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE ABOLISHED THE DEATH PENALTY SINCE 1976 
PORTUGAL abcHshed the cieath ;:>enalty for all offences. · 
CANADA abolished the death penalty for ordinary offences. 
~ 
DENMARK abolished the death penalty for all offences. 
J 
~ abolished the death penalty for ordinary offences. 
LUXEMBOURG. NICARAGUA and NORWAY abolished the death penalty for all 
offences. 
BRAZIL. FIJI and PERU abolished the death penalty for ordinary offences. (ll 
FRANCE abolished the death penalty for a!! offences. 
The NETHERLANDS abolished the death penalty for a!! offences. 
CYPRUS and El SALVADOR abolished the death penalty for ordinary offences. 
ARGENTINA and AUSTRALIA abolished the death penalty for ordinary offences. (2} (31 
AUSTRALIA abolished the death penalty for all offences. {31 
The PHILIPPINES. HAITI, LIECHTENSTEIN and the GERMAN DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC abolished the death penalty for all offences. 
~: CAMBODIA, NEW ZEALAND and ROMANIA abolished the death penalty for all -
offenc~s. 
J.JillQ: ANDORRA, the CZECH AND SLOVAK FEDERA TIV€ REPUBLIC, HUNGARY, IRELAND. 
MOZAMBIQUE, NAMIBIA and SAO TOMt AND PRiNCIPE abolished the death penalty 
for a!! offences. ·-- -·~ · 
NEPAL abolished the death penalty for ordinaf)' of-fences. (41 
ANGU!~LA, CAYMAN ISLANDs; BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS, MONTSERRAT 3r1d TURKS 
AND CAICOS 
< 1 ) Srac:il had abolished the death penalty in 1882 but r-eint-roduced it in 1969 while under 
military rule. 
< 2) Argentina had abolished the death penalty for all offences in 1921 and again in t 972 but 
-reintroduced it in 1976 following a military coup. 
(3) In 1964 the death penalty was abolished in Western Australia. the last Australian state 
to retain the death penalty for ordinary ontences. In 1S85 it was abolished entirely in Australia 
when the state of New South Wales abolished it for piracy, treason and arson at military and naval 
establishments - the only remaining capital offences. , 
(4) Nepal had abolished the death penalty for murder in 1946 but reintroduced it in 1985 
after bomb explosions in which several people were killed. 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (B3-0605/89) 
by Mr ARBELOA MURU, Mr ALVAREZ DE PAZ and Mr BRU PURON 
pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure 
ANNEX 6 
on abolition of the death penalty in the United States of America 
A. deeply concerned at the United States Supreme Court's recent decision, by 
five votes to four, not to consider unconstitutional the execution of 
sixteen- and seventeen-year-old criminals and of the mentally retarded, 
B. whereas since the restoration of the death penalty in the United States 
of America in 1976, at least 111 people have been executed, 
C. whereas in 33 of the 37 States where capital punishment is legal, there 
are another 2200 people on death row, 
D. having regard to the Supreme Court ruling in 1972, to the many State 
governors who have not carried out death sentences during their terms of 
office, and the resolutely abolitionist attitude of many prominent people 
and of large sections of public opinion, 
E. convinced that capital punishment serves no useful penal purpose, runs 
counter to the widely accepted view that it is possible to rehabilitate 
offenders, does not protect society, does nothing to ease the suffering 
of the victims, is irreversible and may be carried out on innocent people 
(at least 23 such may have been executed in the United States this 
century), 
1. Calls on President George Bush of the United States of America and on the 
US Congress to take the steps necessary for the total abolition of the 
death penalty, beginning by not carrying out the executions that are 
pending and subsequently commuting all death sentences. 
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ANNEX 6 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (B3-0682/90) 
by Mr de VRIES 
pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the abolition of the death penalty in the world 
A. whereas the death penalty is a violation of fundamental human rights, is 
imposed arbitrarily and irrevocably and has not reduced crime more 
effectively than other punishments or stopped political violence, 
B. deploring the fact that the use of the death penalty is still frequent 
and widespread, as illustrated by Amnesty International, which recorded 
nearly 16 000 executions in over 80 states during the 1980s, 
C. recalling its resolutions of 18 June 1981 and 17 January 1986, 
1. Calls on the Member States meeting in political cooperation to intervene 
systematically in cases of imminent executions throughout the world, and 
to promote ratification of the Second Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the first universal 
human rights instrument to abolish the death penalty; 
2. Calls on Belgium, Ireland and the UK to ratify the Sixth Protocol to the 
European Human Rights Convention; 
3. Instructs its delegations to express the Parliament's opposition to 
capital punishment in their contacts with parliaments of states that have 
not abolished it; 
4. Recommends its competent committee to draft a study on abolishing the 
death penalty worldwide; 
5. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the 
Ministers meeting in political cooperation. 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (B3-1915/90) 
pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure 
by Mr ARBELOA MURU 
on the death penalty in the world 
~~~=~M¥~g~g~=Eg¥~~g~~~~' 
A. having regard to its resolutions of 19811 and 19862 on the death 
penalty, 
B. welcoming the abolition of the death penalty in recent years in a large 
number of countries, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, 
C. regretting the fact that there are still Member States which have not 
abolished it completely, 
D. regretting the fact that the world's two most powerful nations, the us 
and the USSR, still apply it in many cases, 
1. Calls on the Foreign Ministers meeting in Political Cooperation to hold a 
special meeting to discuss the measures which could be taken by the 
Community in all fields to work towards the abolition of the death 
penalty worldwide. 
1 Doe. 1-65/81 - OJ No. C 172, 13.7.1981, p. 72 
2 Doe. A2-167/85- OJ No. C 36, 17.2.1986, p. 214 
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